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TOURO LAW REVIEW
ticle XVII, section 1.337 The court quickly dismissed this claim,
holding that it could not disturb or question the legislature's de-
termination of need338 in that article XVII, section 1, on its face,
"mandates only that the State provide 'for the aid, care and sup-
port of the needy... in such manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine.' 339
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
In re Jessie C. 3 4 0
(decided Feb. 1, 1991)
The defendant, Jessie C., challenged part of New York's
Sexual Misconduct Statute, Penal Law section 130.20(1),341 as
discriminatory on the basis of gender in violation of the equal
protection provisions of the federal 342 and state343 constitutions.
The appellate division, fourth department, in a unanimous
decision reversed the order of the family court. The court held
that the statute was unconstitutionally underinclusive and struck
the gender exemption portion of the statute. 344
The defendant, a 13 year old male, was declared a juvenile
delinquent because he committed the offense of sexual
misconduct with a 15 year old female in violation of Penal Law
section 130.20(1). "The parties stipulated that there was no
allegation of force and that the female could not consent to sexual
intercourse by reason of her age." 345
337. Lovelace, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
338. Id.; see also Capozzi v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 137
Misc. 2d 193, 196, 520 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1987).
339. Lovelace, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 753 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1),
appeal dismissed without opinion, 78 N.Y.2d 907, 577 N.E.2d 1059, 573
N.Y.S.2d 467 (1991).
340. 164 A.D.2d 731, 565 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th Dep't 1991).
341. N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 130.20 (McKinney 1987) ("A person is guilty of
sexual misconduct when: 1. Being a male, he engages in sexual intercourse
with a female without her consent .... ").
342. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
343. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
344. Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d at 734-36, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 943-44.
345. Id. at 733, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
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The court began its analysis by stating that the statute at issue
was discriminatory on its face on the basis of gender346 because
it expressly created a classification in which only a male could
commit the crime of sexual misconduct.
The court determined that the appropriate standard of review
for a statute that treats males and females differently under the
Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and New York State
Constitutions is mid-level scrutiny. Under mid-level scrutiny, a
statute that is facially discriminatory on the basis of gender
"'violates equal protection unless the classification is
substantially related to the achievement of an important
governmental objective.' 347 The court, relying on the federal
precedent, stated that the prosecution has the burden of
identifying "an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification." ' 348 Among the requirements is the burden of
proving "that the gender-based law serves the governmental
objective better than would a gender-neutral law."
349
Applying mid-level scrutiny to this case, the court found that
the plaintiff, the presentment agency, failed to meet its burden of
proof. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the statute
serves the important governmental objective of preventing
teenage pregnancies. The court noted that a female of any age
can be a victim and, therefore, the statute is not specifically tied
to prevention of teenage pregnancy.
The court stated that even if it is assumed that the statute serves
an important governmental interest in preventing teenage
pregnancies, plaintiff "has failed to demonstrate that this
objective can be better served by a gender-based law than a
346. Id.
347. Id. (quoting People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 168, 474 N.E.2d 567,
576, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 216 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979)).
348. Id. (quoting Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 170, 474 N.E.2d at 577, 485
N.Y.S.2d at 217; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).
349. Id. at 733-34, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43 (citing, inter alia, Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979), on remand, 374 So.2d 895 (Al. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980)).
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gender-neutral law. "350 The statute proscribes both forcible and
non-forcible sexual intercourse. Ii People v. Liberta,351 the court
of appeals concluded that a gender-neutral law would better serve
to deter forcible sexual behavior.352
In Liberta, the New York Court of Appeals found the gender-
based portion of the statutory rape provision violative of the
Equal Protection Clauses of both the Federal and New York State
Constitutions. Applying the intermediate level of scrutiny, the
court reasoned that "[t]o meet their burden of showing that a
gender-based law is substantially related to an important
governmental objective, the people must set forth an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification . . . . 353 The government has the
burden of showing that the gender-based law better serves the
important governmental objective than a gender-neutral law. The
court of appeals, in Liberta, concluded that:
The fact that the act of a female forcibly raping a male may be a
difficult or rare occurrence does not mean that the gender ex-
emption satisfies the constitutional test. A gender-neutral law
would indisputably better serve, even if only marginally, the
objective of deterring and punishing forcible sexual assault. 354
In Jessie, the court determined that as to non-forcible sexual
conduct, the plaintiff failed in its burden of presenting an im-
portant reason why a gender-based statute would better serve the
objective of deterring teenage pregnancies than a gender-neutral
one. The court declined to strike the entire statute, and simply
struck the gender exemption. 355
In Craig v. Boren356 the United States Supreme Court
articulated the intermediate level of scrutiny for the first time as
the appropriate standard for evaluating gender-based
discrimination, claims. In Craig, the Supreme Court concluded
350. Id. at 734, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
351. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
352. See id. at 170, 474 N.E.2d at 577, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
353. Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982)).
354. Id.
355. Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d at 735, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
356. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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that intermediate level scrutiny, the standard that governs
discrimination against women under the Equal Protection Clause,
should be applied to governmental discrimination against men.357
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that rational basis
scrutiny should be applied because the classification drawn in
Craig only discriminated against males. 358 However, the Craig
majority maintained that discrimination against males is also
harmful against women because it furthers old stereotypes and,
thus, promotes old notions concerning the roles of men and
women in society. 359
It is noteworthy that Justice Rehnquist, who believes it is im-
proper for intermediate scrutiny to be used in cases of discrimi-
nation against males, 360 authored the majority opinion in Michael
M. v. Superior Court.361 In Michael M., the majority applied the
Craig mid-level scrutiny test to a gender-based California statu-
tory rape law, which made males alone criminally liable for the
act of sexual intercourse, and upheld the statute. 362 Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that classes of men and women are not
similarly situated with respect to the subject of pregnancy. First,
only women may become pregnant, therefore, "the risk of
pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young
females." 363 Second, a gender-neutral statute would frustrate the
state's interest in effective enforcement because a female would
be less likely to report violations of the statute if she would be
subject to prosecution. 364
Thus, the fourth department, in Jessie, applying the same
standard of review that the Supreme Court utilized in determining
the constitutionality of a gender-based statute in Michael Al.,
reached the opposite conclusion. Michael M., however, involved
a statutory rape statute, while Jessie involved a sexual misconduct
357. Id. at 197-98.
358. Id. at 217-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 198-99.
360. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
361. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
362. Id. at 472-73.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 473.
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Reform Education Financing Inequities Today v. Cuomo 365
(decided December 12, 1991)
See the case discussion under EDUCATION ARTICLE.366 As
to plaintiff's equal protection claim, the court noted that the court
of appeals, in Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School
District v. Nyquist,367 previously upheld the funding scheme
despite disparities in per pupil expenditures among the various
districts. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and
concluded that the legislature has "[p]rimary responsibility for
the provision of fair and equitable educational opportunity
-368
365. No. 2500/91, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County Dec. 12, 1991).
366. See supra notes 279-316 and accompanying text.
367. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983).
368. REFIT, 1991, N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 725, at *24.
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